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The Bubble and the Lost Decade 
 





  In this overview of the Symposium papers, we note that the bubble that occurred 
in Japan’s asset markets in the late 1980s came at a time when the conventional 
indicators o f Japan’s economic performance were relatively stable.  Following the 
collapse of the bubble, neither the Bank of Japan (BOJ) nor the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) took timely and effective measures to deal with the recession that followed.  
While the evidence suggests that looser fiscal policy would have been ineffective, 
monetary policy measures might have worked.  However, the BOJ followed a relatively 
tight monetary policy in 1991-93. 
  In the face of the liquidity trap that ensued in the last of the 1990s,  the 
conventional tools of stabilization policy appeared to be of limited use.  To help the 
Japanese economy to recover from the “lost decade,” we thus discuss a number of 
unconventional and bold measures that the BOJ and MOF could pursue.  It appears, 
however, that the political will is absent to undertake such measures.  So long as this is 



















In reviewing what happened in the 1980s in Japan and how the bursting of the 
bubble created problems in the early 1990s, the following conclusions are obtained. (1) In 
order to limit damage to the economy from a bubble and its bursting, it is important to 
build a resilient financial system through strict supervision policy, so that asset-price 
fluctuations would not weaken financial institutions. Supervision policy would include 
regulatory measures limiting lending concentration and exposure to real-estate-related 
sectors.  (2) Monetary policy should pay attention to asset-price movements. But it may 
be difficult and inappropriate to raise the interest rate sharply when inflation is low 
(below 1 percent like in Japan), even though asset prices are increasing at 30-40 percent.  
(3) The official discount rate could have been raised in the summer of 1988 in Japan, 
when the Federal Reserve and Bundesbank raised interest rates. This would have slowed 
down the rise of stock and land prices, but the bubble was already large by then.  (4) The 
bubble in the second half of the 1980s was only partially responsible for the lost decade 
of the 1990s in Japan. A series of policy errors made a small problem of the burst bubble 




Why Does the Problem Persist?   
“Rational Rigidity” and the Plight of Japanese Banks 
 
Kiyohiko G. Nishimura and Yuko Kawamoto 
 
ABSTRACT 
One of the most perplexing factors in the Japanese financial crisis is the 
apparently non-optimal and non-rational behaviour of Japanese banks.  We provide a 
“rational” explanation for bank behaviour based on a theory of community banking that 
incorporates Japanese  institutional characteristics.  We find three implications of 
community banking  – a low  lending rate, a low bankruptcy rate, and in particular, 
institutionalisation of  “rational rigidity” (an institutional pledge of no profit 
maximization) – in Japanese banks.  We argue that this type of banking is viable as long 
as the economy expands and asset prices go up, which was the case before the asset-
market crash in 1990.  The stagnation and free-fall of asset prices in the 1990s exerted 
tremendous pressure on Japanese banks but did not paralyse them completely in the 
1990s, although there are indications that they failed to restructure distressed large 
corporations in some sectors, notably real estate.  Thus, the problem is not that paralysed 
banks are blocking recovery, but that their current institutionalised rigidity in banking 
practices is no longer viable because private enterprises in the market economy are 




Japan's Fiscal Policies in the 1990s 
Toshihiro Ihori 
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This paper first summarizes Japan's fiscal policies in the 1990s. Then, we 
investigate the macroeconomic impact of government debt and the sustainability 
problem.  We find that the Keynesian fiscal policy in the 1990s was not effective and 
fiscal sustainability may therefore become a serious issue. We also estimate the optimal 
level of deficits and evaluate fiscal reconstruction movements. It is shown that the actual 
deficit exceeded the optimal level in the late 1990s.  We then inspect fiscal reconstruction 
movements in the Hashimoto Administration in 1997 and find that the major factor of 
recession in 1997 was not fiscal consolidation.  An important lesson from Japan's fiscal 
policies in the 1990s is that long-run structural reform is more important than short-run 




Japan’s Negative Risk Premium in Interest Rates: 
The Liquidity Trap and Fall in Bank Lending 
 
Rishi Goyal and Ronald McKinnon 
 
ABSTRACT 
Japan's interest rates have been compressed toward zero because of pressure 
coming through the foreign exchanges.  Twenty years of current-account surpluses have 
led to a huge buildup of claims – mainly dollars – on foreigners.  Because of ongoing 
fluctuations in the yen/dollar exchange rate, Japanese financial institutions will only 
willingly hold these dollar claims if the nominal yield on them is substantially higher than 
on yen assets. In the 1990s to 2002 as U.S. interest rates have come down, portfolio 
equilibrium has been sustained only when nominal interest rates on yen assets have been 
forced toward zero.  One consequence is the now infamous liquidity trap for Japanese 
monetary policy.  A second consequence is the erosion of the normal profit margins of 
Japan's commercial banks, leading to a slump in new bank credit and an inability to grow 











After briefly explaining the causes of  the Japanese asset-price bubble in the 
1980s, this paper analyzes why the bursting of the bubble developed into a full-fledged 
financial crisis in the late 1990s.  In order to cope with this crisis, the Government has 
injected capital directly into the banking sector and banks  have written off enormous 
amounts of bad loans.  However, the Japanese financial sector remains very weak and 
Japan still faces a number of problems in its financial system.   
Firstly, the profit margin of banks is too small to cover the increased default risk 
following the bursting of the bubble, and there are  market distortions created by the 
government-backed financial institutions and the requirements on new lending to small 
and medium sized companies.  Secondly, banks still have excessive stock investment and 
crossholding of shares between banks and other companies  has weakened the market 
discipline on entrenched management.  Thirdly, the government guarantee of all banking-
sector liabilities should be removed.  Once the financial system is stabilized, a risk-
adjusted deposit insurance premium should be introduced so as to strengthen market 
discipline on banks, and the huge postal saving system should be privatized to create a 
level-playing field among deposit taking financial institutions. 
Besides the foregoing, the  weak corporate governance structure of Japanese 
financial institutions has to be remodeled.  The management of banks has shielded 
themselves by extensive cross-shareholdings, especially with life insurance companies.  




have weak corporate governance, and many of the large shareholders of banks are life 
insurance companies.  This double gearing between banks and life insurance companies 
has therefore weakened the market control of Japanese financial institutions. 
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